The evolution of returns to education in the Middle East and North Africa: Evidence from comparable education policy changes in Tunisia by Pellicer, Miquel
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321258805
The evolution of returns to education in the Middle East and North Africa:
Evidence from comparable education policy changes in Tunisia
Article  in  Economics of Education Review · November 2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2017.11.008
CITATION
1
READS
87
1 author:
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Inequality in South Africa View project
Islamist Parties View project
Miquel Pellicer
University of Duisburg-Essen
23 PUBLICATIONS   132 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
All content following this page was uploaded by Miquel Pellicer on 28 December 2017.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
The evolution of returns to education in the
Middle East and North Africa: Evidence
from comparable education policy changes in
Tunisia∗
Miquel Pellicer
University of Duisburg-Essen and University College Dublin
November 9, 2017
Abstract
Returns to education in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region are thought to have decreased in recent decades leading to
youth frustration and political mobilization. Existing estimates of
the evolution of education returns in the region have not had a causal
focus and observed patterns may be driven by changes in selection
bias as educational attainment expanded from a privileged few to
large masses of the population. This paper exploits three compara-
ble education policy changes over more than two decades in Tunisia
to estimate the effect of education on public sector employment for
different cohorts born from the 1950s to the 1970s. I combine census
and labor force surveys from 2004 to 2010 amounting to more than
one million observations of relevant cohorts. I find that returns have
decreased across cohorts by around 1/3 although they remain large
even for the later cohorts.
∗I would like to thank Eva Wegner, Tuomas Pekkarinen, Caroline Krafft and Ragui
Assaad for useful comments on previous drafts. All errors are mine. Contact informa-
tion: Miquel Pellicer, Geary Institute, UCD. Email: pellicer.miquel@gmail.com
1
1 Introduction
There is increasing interest in understanding returns to education in devel-
oping countries. Two recent studies provide homogeneous estimates of re-
turns to education in many different countries around the world (Montenegro
and Patrinos (2014), Peet, Fink, and Fawzi (2015)). These studies find that,
on average, returns to education tend to be similar (Peet et al. (2015)) or
rather higher (Montenegro and Patrinos (2014)) in developing than in de-
veloped countries. Both studies find that returns to education in developing
countries appear to have generally decreased over recent decades. These
results can be interpreted, as do Montenegro and Patrinos (2014), as pro-
viding evidence that prices for skills track differences in supply: as human
capital becomes less scarce (in developing countries relative to developed
ones, and over recent decades) its reward falls.
However, since these estimates do not have a causal focus, another sim-
ple explanation is possible, notably, that the estimated differences across
regions and over time could be due to differences in selection bias rather
than differences in genuine education returns. When educational attain-
ment is relatively low, the few obtaining high levels of education might be
from a particularly privileged background, leading to strong selection bias.
As educational attainment increases, the pool of educated individuals be-
comes less privileged and selection bias ought to become lower. There are
several articles that have estimated causal returns to education in devel-
oping countries using school expansions or education reforms (see for in-
stance, Duflo et al. (2001), Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, Rozelle, and Zeckhauser
(2012), Ozier (2016) and Aydemir and Kirdar (2017)). But estimates are
still too few and differ too widely between studies to infer general con-
clusions. Moreover, no study has to the best of my knowledge explored
the evolution of returns to education over time with a causal focus. More
causal evidence is needed to understand returns to education in developing
countries.
The importance of understanding returns to education and their change
over time is particularly clear for the Middle east and North Africa (MENA)
region. Returns to education feature prominently in explanations of the
2011 “Arab Uprisings” as well as in the successful popular religious Is-
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lamist mobilization in the region during recent decades. Such political
mobilization is often attributed to the frustration engendered by the de-
crease in education returns in the region (see Goldstone (2011), Sanborn
and Thyne (2014), Assaad (2014) for the “Arab Uprisigins” and Binzel and
Carvalho (2016) for Islamist mobilization). Indeed, returns to education
in the MENA appear to be lower than in other regions (Montenegro and
Patrinos (2014)); unemployment rates of secondary/ university graduates
in the MENA appear to be relatively high (Assaad (2014) and Campante
and Chor (2012)); and individuals with higher education have tended to
have less desirable jobs across cohorts (Binzel and Carvalho (2016)). These
estimates, however, not attempting to be causal, suffer from the problem
mentioned above. Educational attainment has expanded dramatically in
the MENA in recent decades and the decreasing selectivity of education,
rather than returns to education per se, may explain why the association
between education and labor market outcomes has worsen over time to be-
come one of the lowest in developing countries. Failure to obtain privileged
jobs by recently educated middle classes need not generate frustration if in
the past only a small highly educated privileged minority obtained privi-
leged jobs because of their background.
This paper investigates returns to education in Tunisia and their change
over last decades with a causal focus. To obtain estimates purged from po-
tential selection biases I identify the effect of education using a quite unique
set of three policy changes in Tunisia from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
All these three policy changes affected the transition from primary to sec-
ondary school. During the 1960s, promotion rates from primary school to
secondary school in Tunisia were around 40%, declined suddenly to around
25% in 1971, and were brought back to around 40% in 1980; in 1992, amid
concerns that children were leaving education too early, promotion rates
again increased, this time in a more gradual manner. The uniqueness of
this set of policy changes lies in the fact that these changes span more than
two decades while remaining comparable, and thus can be used to identify
and compare the effect of education for different generations.
The data for the analysis come from the 2004 census as well as the 2005-
2010 waves of the Tunisian Labor Force Survey. These are large data sets,
with 300,000 to 600,000 individual observations in each labor force survey
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and around 2 million observations in the census. The different data sets
are highly consistent, having been conducted at the same time of the year
and using the same questions. I restrict the analysis to men, in order to
abstract from the complex issues related to female labor force participation
and female public sector employment in the region. The availability of 7
years of data allows me to control for age in a flexible way. In particular,
all my regressions use year and age fixed effects.
The 1971 and 1980 changes (used in previous work in Pekkarinen and
Pellicer (2013)) are analyzed using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design,
while the 1992 change, being more gradual, is well suited for a regression
kink approach. I conduct the analysis of the three policy adjustments
separately. The first stage shows that all the discontinuities employed had
strong effects on education. The jumps in 1971 and 1980 lead to a change
of around 1 grade completed. The 1992 kink increased the educational
attainment of around 0.2 grades completed per year born after the kink.
I focus on returns in terms of “good quality” jobs, particularly public
sector employment, for my data does not contain information on wages.
Public sector employment is consistently ranked highest among employ-
ment types by MENA youth for its benefits and prestige (see Assaad (2014)
and Groh, McKenzie, Shammout, and Vishwanath (2014)). Moreover, ac-
counts of youth political mobilization in the MENA single out the fall in
returns to education in terms of public sector employment as origin of youth
frustration (Assaad (2014), Binzel and Carvalho (2016)). Using public sec-
tor employment as main outcome also reduces the concern of conflating
cohort and age effects in my estimates. Since I observe all cohorts essen-
tially at the same, early cohorts are observed when old and late cohorts are
observed when young. I provide suggestive evidence that, for public sector
employment, age effects are relatively unimportant for the ages at which
my effects are estimated.
I find evidence of a decrease in the returns to education in terms of
good jobs. My estimates suggest a decline of around 1/3 between cohorts
born in the 1950s and those born in the 1970s. However, in spite of this,
I find that education still increases substantially the chances of obtaining
public sector jobs even for youth. My preferred estimates imply that one
more year of education increases the chance of public sector employment
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by 4pp for the younger cohorts. In a context where around 19% of males
in my sample hold a public sector job, this figure is still quite large.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the educational
policy changes in Tunisia that I use to identify the effect of education.
Sections 3 and 4 present the data and the empirical approach, respectively.
Section 5 shows the results and section 6 discusses them and concludes.
2 Access to secondary school in Tunisia
Since independence in 1956, education has been a key concern for the
Tunisian government. The government has sought to affect enrollment
rates in different ways at different points in time. One of these ways has
been to regulate access to secondary school. Until the 1990s, there was a
nation-wide examination at the end of the last year of primary school (6th
grade) regulating access to secondary school.
There is some evidence that thresholds for passing such exam were
politically manipulated in order to follow specific policy objectives. For
instance, a meeting at the Education Ministry stated quite explicitly that
“We have admitted [to secondary school] only the candidates having passed
the threshold except in the disadvantaged provinces, where, as a political
option, it was decided to lower the threshold to 9.6 [from the ‘theoreti-
cal’ threshold of 10]”, (Ministe`re de l’Education Nationale, 1974). In some
years, this manipulation of access to secondary school has been very severe,
leading to substantial changes in educational attainment of specific cohorts.
These ”policy changes” (or “policy adjustments”) form the basis for the
instruments for educational attainment in this paper. Pekkarinen and Pel-
licer (2013) discuss two such adjustments occurring during the 1970s. This
paper adds to these another one from the 1990s.
2.1 Policy changes in the 1970s
Figure 1 shows the evolution of promotion rates from the last year of pri-
mary school into secondary school. After many years with promotion rates
of around 40%, ever increasing school enrollments and investments in edu-
cation generated budgetary pressures that induced the government to dras-
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tically reduce access to secondary school. In 1971, thus, promotion rates
fell to around 25%.
During the 1970s, however it became apparent that the reduction in
promotion rates was problematic. The school system at the time consisted
of 6 years of primary school and 7 years of secondary. It was considered
that too many students were dropping out of the school system too young,
after only 6 years of education. Promotion rates, thus suddenly jumped
back up in 1980, again to around 40%.
Pekkarinen and Pellicer (2013) show that these changes in promotion
rates had a strong impact on educational attainment of men. In particular,
cohorts exposed to the low access policy regime of the 1970s obtain on
average around 1 less year of education and are around 10pp less likely to
attain secondary or university education.
2.2 Policy changes in the 1990s
Even if promotion rates had somewhat increased during the 1980s, con-
cerns remained about children dropping out of the schooling system too
early. A World Bank loan report (World Bank (1989)) describes in detail
the situation as viewed at the time and the proposed solutions. Most im-
portantly, a major policy reform was planned that consolidated primary
school and the first three years of secondary school into a single cycle to
be called “basic education”. The reform was signed into law in 1991.
Given that the biggest bottleneck at the time in the first years of ed-
ucation system was grade 6, the reform explicitly set targets for promo-
tion rates from grade 6 to grade 7, starting in 1992 (from 45% to 70% by
1995) (World Bank (1989)). An important difference relative to the policy
changes of the 1970s, however, is that the change was to be somewhat more
gradual, possibly to prevent a sudden overflow of classes at the upper basic
level. Indeed, World Bank (1989) states as planned benefits of the reform
“an increase in the number of students enrolled in upper basic education
of 123,000 over the 1992-96 Plan and 152,000 over the 1997-2001 Plan” (p.
ii).
The evolution of promotion rates in figure 1 is consistent with these
plans. In particular, we observe a sudden increase in these rates in 1992,
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after which promotion rates continue to increase. In 2001, having reached
promotion rates of almost 90%, the increasing trend stops.
In the analysis that follows, all these different sudden changes in pro-
motion rates will be used as separate instruments for secondary/ university
education affecting different cohorts. The changes in 1971 and 1980 corre-
spond to a one-off jump and so will be exploited using a regression fuzzy
discontinuity design. The change in 1992 continues in later years and will
be analyzed using a regression kink approach. As will be shown below,
taking into account the effects of grade repetition, these approaches fit the
evolution of male educational attainment remarkably well.
It is important to note that the three “policy adjustments” considered
are quite comparable as they all affect promotion rates out of grade 6 of
primary school. The fact that the 1992 change was part of the larger reform
establishing “basic education” could be a concern as the larger reform not
only affected promotion rates but possibly the whole educational system.
However, in the analysis below this turns out not to matter much. “Basic
education” started in 1989 so that the first cohort turning 6 and being fully
exposed to it was born in 1983. The increase in promotion rate occurred
in 1992, before this cohort reached 6th grade, and thus applied to cohorts
still in the old primary-secondary system. As it happens, I use in the
analysis below of the 1992 kink cohorts born no later than 1983 and so
the effect identified does not incorporate the role of the establishment of
“basic education”. Rather, the reform used concerns simply an increase in
promotion rates from the old primary to the old secondary levels, as the
other policy changes so that the three policy changes ought to be indeed
comparable.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
The data for the analysis come from the 2004 census and the 2005-2010
waves of the Tunisian Labor Force Survey (LFS). Sample sizes are large:
my version of the census data includes around 2 million observations (one
quarter of the Tunisian population) and the LFSs have sample sizes ranging
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from around 300,000 per wave in 2005 and 2006, to around 600,000 per
wave in the years 2007 to 2010.1 All surveys provide weights to recover
the representativity of the sample, and I use these weights throughout the
analysis.
All data sources include information on age, education, employment, as
well as job characteristics, such as employment status (employer, employee,
independent, etc.) or place of employment (public sector, etc.) Education
is coded in four levels: no education, primary, secondary and university.
Primary/ secondary is always coded under the “old regime” of 6 years
of primary and 7 of secondary. Secondary education includes vocational
training.
All datasets have a high degree of consistency. They all have used
the same questionnaire and have been undertaken at the same time (from
March to June of the respective year). Data post-collection processing has
also been harmonized by the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS).
For the analysis below, I code employment-related variables as dummy
variables with value zero if the category is not fulfilled (instead of missing).
Thus, public sector employment is coded zero even if the person is inactive.
While all surveys have pre-processed information on education levels
there is generally no information on actual grades (i.e. years) completed.
Since such a variable turns out to be useful for the analysis, I construct
an approximation of this with the available information. In particular,
the 2010 LFS does have information on grades completed and from this I
compute the average grades completed at each education level (primary,
secondary and university attainment).2 With this information, I construct
a variable for all survey years, denoted “approximate grades completed”,
that attributes to each education level its corresponding average grades
completed.
1All these data are freely available online at http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexfr.php
2I do this for the cohorts affected by each of the policy changes and the figures happen
to be very similar for the different cohorts. These are 0 for no education, .7 for primary,
10.3 for secondary and 16.5 for university.
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3.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the key variables in the differ-
ent samples used in the analysis. The different subsamples correspond to
windows around the different jumps or kinks in birth year that I exploit
as instruments for education, as well as the full sample including all these
windows. Each subsample, thus, corresponds to different birth cohorts and
ages. For each subsample, the mean of the variables are shown. The values
in the table are sensible, giving some confidence in the data to be used.
These show, for instance, the steady increase in educational attainment
and the apparent decline in public sector employment over cohorts.
A data quality issue to mention which is potentially relevant for iden-
tification is age heaping (see Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, and Waddell (2010)).
As expected, inspection of age distributions shows clear evidence of age
heaping. I thus follow Barreca et al. (2010) and perform the analyses with-
out the bunched age and birth year values.3 In any case, the issue is not
critical to our results: (unreported) regressions show that while estimates
are somewhat less similar across specifications when using the raw data,
this does not affect results substantively.
4 Empirical Approach
The empirical approach in this paper exploits the education policy changes
of the 1970s, 80s and 90s to identify the effect of education on public sector
employment. Following the literature, I aggregate the data into cells given
by survey year and birth cohort (ex. Oreopoulos (2006) or Hungerman
(2014)). I consider a “grouped probability model” such as:
piact = α0t + γ0a + h0(c) + βEact + uact (1)
where a indexes age, c indexes cohort (i.e. year of birth) and t indexes
time (i.e. survey year). pi refers to the probability associated to the outcome
variable public sector employment, and u denotes an error term. α0t and
γ0a are time and age fixed effects, respectively, while h0 is a potentially
3In particular, I compute, by survey year, the age cells with more than 10% more
counts than the average of the preceding and following age cells, and erase these.
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non-linear function of birth cohort. E denotes education, in particular
attainment of secondary/ university or approximate grades completed, and
thus β is the parameter of interest.
4.1 Instruments
Because of the possible endogeneity of education, I instrument education
with exposure to the different policy changes above. In particular, I con-
sider three instruments: the jump in promotion rates to 7th grade in 1971
and in 1980, and the (gradual) increase in these rates from 1992 onward.
To the best of my knowledge, these changes were not announced, implying
that students would not have been able to act strategically to benefit from
(or protect themselves against) changes promotion rates.4
The first two instruments, exposure to the 1971 and the 1980 jump in
promotion rates, are essentially step functions of the birth cohort. If all
students started schooling at age six and there was no grade repetition,
children born after 1959 (1968) would have faced low (high) promotion
rates and vice-versa. In reality, earlier cohorts also get some exposure to
the policy change because of grade repetition. I use the cohort distribu-
tion of grade 6 boys in 1967 and 1982 to determine exposure of earlier
cohorts to the policy changes in 1971 and 1980, respectively (see Ministe`re
de l’Education Nationale (1967) and Ministe`re de l’Education Nationale
(1983)). These distributions imply that only a small minority of boys were
12 years old in grade 6 (25% in 1982 and 10% in 1967).5 The instruments
used for exposure to the 1980 and 1971 policy changes are thus step func-
tions, except that instead of an abrupt zero-one change at a given birth
year, the step is divided between several cohorts. Identification using these
instruments is essentially as in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
The first stage using these instruments (denoted by D1c) is:
4In the course of the research for this project, I conducted interviews with a former
education minister (active for 2 years in the mid 1990s), with a senior academic with
expertise on education in Tunisia, as well as enquired with people of the relevant cohorts
about the policy changes. Only the ex-minister of education was familiar with the idea
that promotion rates were manipulated in order to regulate the supply of secondary
school students. All other informants did not know about these policy changes.
5The exact figures I use are, for 1980: 0.02 born in 1964, 0.16 in 1965, 0.27 in 1966,
0.29 in 1967, 0.22 in 1968 and 0.04 in 1969. For 1971, these are 0.21 born in 1955, 0.25
in 1956, 0.24 in 1957, 0.18 in 1958, 0.1 in 1959 and 0.02 in 1960.
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Eact = α1t + γ1a + h1(c) + ρ1D1c + uact (2)
with ρ1 being the first stage coefficient.
The second type of instrument used is a kink function of the birth
cohort. As mentioned above, promotion rates jumped upward in 1992
and increased thereafter until 2001. Absent grade repetition, educational
attainment would follow exactly the same pattern: an initial jump followed
by a gradual increase. However, grade repetition distributes the initial
jump into several earlier cohorts and this in effect implies that the resulting
pattern can be well approximated by a kink. Using again the 1982 cohort
distribution of grade 6, the kink is estimated to start at the 1976 cohort.
The first stage using the kinked instrument is:
Eact = α2t + γ2a + h2(c) + ρ2cD2c + uact (3)
where D2c equals 1 for cohorts born after 1976 and zero otherwise, and
birth cohort c is centered at 1976. The first stage coefficient using the kink
instrument is ρ2.
Figure 2 illustrates the suitability of these instruments. The figure
shows secondary or university attainment (i.e. achievement of more than
grade 6 of primary schooling) for different birth cohorts. A solid line shows
the fitted values of a regression such as 2 and 3, only that in this case,
the whole sample is considered and all instruments are included together
with a 2nd degree polynomial on birth year. The fit is remarkably good.
The figure clearly shows first a downward and then an upward shift from
the 1971 and 1980 jumps. As just mentioned, the downward and upward
shifts are distributed over several cohorts due to grade repetition and this
can obscure the jumps. To make the jumps visually clearer, the figure also
adds a dashed line that removes the smoothing of the instruments from
grade repetition. This is a fitted regression that replaces the 1971 and the
1980 instruments by indicator functions with value one for cohorts above
the cohort most exposed to the policy shift.6 The jumps in educational
6In particular, the variable has value one for cohorts above the modal cohort among
those exposed to the policy shift; for instance, for the 1971 jump, this is the cohort born
in 1956.
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attainment following the 1971 and 1980 jumps are thus very clear.
Regarding the post-1992 policy adjustment, a kink starting in 1976 is
apparent. It appears that modeling the effect of this policy change as a
kink in educational attainment is a good approximation.7
4.2 Polynomial and window specifications
When implementing regression discontinuity or regression kink designs,
bandwidths and polynomial degrees need to be chosen. My choices of
bandwidth are somewhat restricted by the discontinuities in other parts of
the distribution. In particular, there are 7 or 8 birth years between the
discontinuities I exploit: i.e. from 1969, the last cohort affected directly
by the 1980 jump, and 1976, the first cohort affected by the kink (and
similarly for the 1971 and the 1980 jumps).8
Given this constraint, my choice of specifications is rather pragmatic. I
consider two specifications, one quadratic with the maximum sensible win-
dow (7 years) and one linear with small window (4 years). For the 1992
kink, the quadratic specification follows the common practice of interact-
ing the second degree polynomial with the indicator function D2c. For the
1971 and 1980 jumps, all specifications allow for the slope to be different
before and after the jump. Given the lack of certainty regarding the best
specification to use in regression kink designs reported in Card, Lee, Pei,
and Weber (2016), I present in the on-line appendix results for all different
bandwidths between 4 and 7 for both the linear and the quadratic specifi-
cation. The specification I will use as benchmark is the linear one with the
smallest (4 year) window. Finally, all standard errors are clustered at the
7The use of a regression kink approach in this setting is somewhat unusual. Typically,
analyses using this approach have exploited explicitly kinked allocation rules (see, for
instance Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber (2012) or Dobbie and Skiba (2013)). In my case,
there is no explicitly kinked allocation rule. Still, the policy change (the sudden increase
in promotion rates in 1992) does generate a kink owing to a non-degenerate distribution
of cohorts exposed to this jump, as shown in figure 2. Another point to note regarding
the use of regression kink design in this context is that, contrary to other settings, the
running variable here (birth year) is hardly manipulable. Therefore, the assumptions
that enable a causal interpretation of the regression kink estimates are more likely to
hold than in other settings (ex. where the running variable is income, see Jones (2013)
or Card et al. (2012)).
8The first cohort affected substantially by 1980 jump was born in 1965 while the
1971 jump ends precisely at cohort born in 1958
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birth year level.
4.3 Life cycle concerns
Comparing returns to education for different cohorts at the same time
conflates cohort effects and age effects. Ideally, to solve this issues, one
would want to observe different cohorts at the same age. In my case, this
is not possible. The regression discontinuity and kink approaches identify
the effect of education for the specific age at which the jump/ kink takes
place. The 1992 kink identifies the effect for individuals born in 1976, which
at the time the surveys took place were in their late 20s/ early 30s. For the
1971 jump, effects are identified for individuals born around 1956, which
at the time the surveys took place were in their late 40s/ early 50s.
How much of a problem this is depends on the life-cycle pattern of
returns. A recent study on the life-cycle return to education in Norway
using wages as outcome (Bhuller, Mogstad, and Salvanes (in press)) shows
that returns to education appear upward sloping up until the age of 50.
Attributing differences in returns at age 50 and age 30 to cohort effects
could be highly misleading. In my case, the outcome is public sector em-
ployment, and this is likely to have a flatter life-cycle profile than wages:
public employees are likely to have reached the public sector before age
50 and to keep working there thereafter, even as their wages continue in-
creasing. Figure A1 in the online appendix provides evidence on this issue,
showing age profiles of public sector employment as well as the age profile
of OLS-based returns to education in terms of public sector employment.
The figure indicates rapid increases in these until age 30; a slow down to
peak at 35; and stability until the mid 50s. This suggests that life cycle
considerations are not very problematic when comparing public sector em-
ployment for cohorts observed in the early 30s with cohorts observed up to
the early 50s.
Using all surveys, the mean age (weighted by cell size) of individuals
born in 1976 is 29 and the mean age of individuals born in 1956 is 49.2. At
29, returns still seem to increase rather rapidly so it seems appropriate to
observe such youth at a slightly older age. To do so I also run the analysis
considering only the later years, from 2007 to 2010. This allows me to
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bring the identified age of the 1976 cohort to 31.2 while still allowing me
to control for a full set of age dummies. The mean age for the older cohort
in turn becomes 51.4.9
5 Results
5.1 First stage results
Table 2 shows the first stage for the different instruments and different
possible endogenous variables. Each column corresponds to a different
specification in terms of polynomial/ window and waves used, and each row
panel corresponds to a different instrument: the 1971 and 1980 jumps, and
the 1992 kink. I consider as first potential endogenous variable attainment
of secondary or university. This is the “natural” endogenous variable of
the analysis, since this is the margin affected by the instruments used.
As expected from the figure above, all instruments are quite strong.
Attainment of secondary or university decreases by around 18 pp and re-
bounds around 8 pp from the reduction and subsequent recuperation of
promotion rates in 1971 and 1980, respectively. The 1992 kink increases
the slope of this education variable by around 2 pp. This number is quite
large, implying that cohorts 5 years after the kink experienced 10 pp more
attainment of secondary/ university than if the kink had not happened.
The table also shows that estimates are quite similar across specifica-
tions. This strengthens the confidence on the different instruments, par-
ticularly the 1992 kink which is somewhat heterodox: the kink appears to
be present with a window of 4 years as well as when using the 2nd degree
polynomial at either side of the kink. All estimates are also similar when
considering the restricted 2007-2010 sample.
While attainment of secondary or university education might be the
most natural instrument in our setting, it may not be the most appropri-
ate for our purposes. The reason is that we want to compare the effect
of different policy changes. While all policy changes affected the primary/
9On the basis of figure A1 in the on-line appendix, the difference in returns at-
tributable to age effects when comparing the 1976 and 1956 cohort would then be fairly
small, of 0.005.
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secondary margin, it may still be the case that they induced a different
share of children to reach university. This would then render comparison
between instruments misleading. The second row in each panel of table
2 shows the effect of the instruments on attainment of university. As ex-
pected, these coefficients are lower than those for secondary/university. For
the 1992 kink, around 40% of those progressing beyond primary because of
the instrument made it to university. This share is smaller for earlier policy
changes, the 1980 jump (35%), and particularly the 1971 jump (13%).
Given these differences in the mix of secondary/ university attainment
induced by the different policy changes, I use approximate grades completed
as endogenous variable in the analysis. The third row in each panel shows
the first stage results for this variable. According to this variable, the 1992
kink increased the attainment by around 0.2 grades completed per year
born after the kink, whereas the 1980 and 1971 jumps lead to around 0.75
more and 1.2 fewer years of education, respectively. Overall, it is clear that
all the policy changes I consider had an economically significant effect on
educational attainment.
5.2 Effect of education on public employment for dif-
ferent cohorts
Reduced form results
Table 3 presents the reduced form results. As before, columns represent
different specifications, while rows refer to the analysis using different in-
struments and outcome variables. The first row panel uses public sector
employment as outcome variable, the main outcome of interest. The pat-
tern shown in the table is very robust: Using all instruments and in all
specifications, cohorts exposed to better promotion rates show higher pub-
lic sector employment. Possibly the most noticeable result in the table is
that the positive effect of education on public sector employment is appar-
ent even for younger cohorts. Figure A2 in the on-line appendix presents
the graphical counterpart of the reduced form estimates, and illustrates
clearly the effect of all three policy changes on public sector employment.
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IV results
While it appears clear that education increases the chances of obtaining
public sector employment, even for younger cohorts, the question of interest
is whether such returns have decreased across cohorts. In order to address
this question, table 4 shows the corresponding OLS/ IV results. Again, we
focus on the first row panel that uses public sector employment as outcome
variable.
The first insight from the IV estimates is that estimated effects are very
large. Coefficients range from 0.025 to 0.07, implying that an increase in,
say, 4 years of education improves the chances of obtaining public sector
employment by between 10pp and 28pp.
The second, and possibly most important insight, is that effects appear
consistently larger for the oldest cohort, the one born in the 1950s, and
reaching the labor market in the 1970s. Whereas comparisons between the
youngest and middle cohorts are inconclusive and depend on the specifica-
tion, comparisons between the youngest and oldest cohorts are consistent.
The last rows of the panel present the difference in coefficients between
these cohorts and the p-value of this difference. The difference is around 2-
3pp, and is statistically significant at conventional levels. The magnitude
is also economically significant, a 1/3 decrease, providing evidence that
indeed returns to education in terms of public sector employment have
declined noticeably across cohorts.
5.3 Robustness
Life-cycle effects
I consider several robustness checks of the main results of the paper. First,
I consider whether results are driven by life cycle effects. The last col-
umn of tables 3 and 4 present the reduced form and IV results using the
2007-2010 sample, where effects are identified for older youth, aged 31.2.
Coefficients for the 1992 kink do not go up when identifying the effect for
older individuals. Actually, coefficients are very similar to those estimated
with the sample of all years. Reassuringly, the same applies to the coeffi-
cients for the oldest cohorts, and this implies that the difference between
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the two remains similar, as shown in the last rows of the panel of table 4.
It appears that life-cycle effects are not driving the difference in returns for
the different cohorts.
Other types of “good jobs”
I also consider the robustness of my results to “good jobs” other than public
sector employment. While public sector jobs are the paradigmatic example
of a good job in the MENA region, there are other measures of good jobs
that can be used, most notably jobs associated to high levels of skill. As
an alternative measure of desirable jobs I consider jobs as professional or
technician: categories 2 and 3 of the ILO ISCO-08 classification. These
jobs are categorized by the ILO as having the highest levels of skill.10
The second row panel of tables 3 and 4 show the corresponding results
for high skill occupations. It is worth noting that this variable is only
present for 2004, 2009 and 2010, so that estimates are somewhat less re-
liable. Nevertheless, the pattern in the table is fairly clear: while for the
oldest cohort the effects of education on skilled jobs is clear and relatively
high, for the youngest cohort effects are fairly small. The difference in
effect between the youngest and oldest cohort is of around 2pp. and is
statistically significant. Education appears to have reduced opportunities
to obtain good jobs even beyond the public sector.11
It is also interesting to note the direction of the OLS biases: whereas
OLS estimates tend to be larger than IV estimates when it comes to skilled
occupations, the reverse holds true for public sector occupations. This
suggests that ability bias may be relevant for skilled occupations, but not
so much for public sector employment.
Potential Confounders
I also consider the possibility that my results may be driven by confounders;
i.e. shocks or policy changes relevant for public sector employment simulta-
10I exclude category 1 of managerial jobs. These jobs, while also requiring high levels of
skill, have a strong age gradient which would confound the comparison between younger
and older cohorts.
11I do not attempt to carry out the estimation for the high skill job variable when
restricting the sample to the 2007-2010. The reason is that, since this variable is not
available in several survey years, I cannot control for age in a sufficiently flexible way.
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neous with the policy changes used as instrument. While it is not possible
to verify explicitly for all these, there are reasons that alleviate these con-
cerns in this case. Most notably, it is unlikely that macro factors affecting
the economy or the political system at a given point in time counfound my
results. The reason is that the effects identified are cohort effects. Changes
occurring during a given year, say a policy retrenching public sector em-
ployment, would affect many different cohorts entering the labor market
at that moment: those just finishing university, those finishing secondary
school and not continuing, younger cohorts not having repeated any course,
older cohorts having started later or having repeated, etc. The effect of
such policy would thus be severely diluted across several cohorts render-
ing it very unlikely to generate the results observed. The counfounders
potentially relevant are those that generate variation at the cohort level.
However, the size of the education effects we observe are so large that it
seems unlikely that cohort effects unrelated to education policy have labor
market implications comparable to these.
Regarding education policy, to the best of my knowledge, no substan-
tial policy occurred simultaneously with the ones considered here. The fact
that the policy changes I use are only “adjustments”, and not large pol-
icy reforms reduces the chances that other components of education policy
changed at the same time. There are however two potential confounders
emerging from the very policy changes I use as instruments. First, the
expansion and reductions in enrollment generated by the change in promo-
tion rates would have had implications for class size, and this could affect
learning and future labor market outcomes. This could bias results towards
zero because the change in learning would go in the opposite direction as
the change in educational attainment of the cohort. For instance, the 1971
retrenchment would lead to small class that would improve the outcomes
of the affected cohorts, partly compensating the impact of the reduction
in educational attainment. This is, however, a second order effect and un-
likely to lead to a very large bias relative to the size of the effects estimated.
Moreover, this potential bias should not affect very much comparisons be-
tween different policy changes, since all biases would be attenuating.
Another potential confounder emerging from the policy changes used
as instruments comes from the first policy adjustment in 1971, which may
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have had some effects on other cohorts. There is some evidence the 1971
restrictions on access to secondary school were accompanied by restrictions
to access to primary school.12 This would have affected cohorts born around
1964, close to the cohorts affected by the 1980 policy adjustment. This,
in turn, could generate discontinuities in access to primary school that
confound the effect of the 1980 policy change.13
To check this, I perform a “placebo” first stage on the share of cohorts
with no formal education. Results are in table A1 in the on-line appendix.
Ideally, such placebo exercise would deliver insignificant results, for the
instruments used affected access to secondary school and ought to have left
the share of people with no formal education unchanged. This is indeed
largely the case for the the 1971 and 1992 policy changes. However, for
the reasons just exposed, the 1980 policy change does show some effect,
although such effect is relatively small. In any case, this confounder has no
impact on the main results of the paper. Table A2 in the on-line appendix
re-estimates the IV regressions adding the share of people with no education
as an additional control. Qualitatively, results remain unchanged. Results
are very similar for the 1971 and 1992 policy changes while coefficients for
the 1980 change become slightly higher. If at all, results are neater with
this specification, since the decline in returns estimated is more gradual,
from around 0.7 to 0.55 and then to 0.4 for the 1971, 1980 and 1992 policy
changes, respectively.
Different Windows and Weights
Finally, I consider robustness to different windows and to the absence of
survey weights. Table A3 in the on-line appendix show the results allowing
for windows between 4 and 7 for both, the linear and the quadratic speci-
fications. Results are substantively the same across specifications. For the
1976 cohort, returns tend to be between 0.03 to 0.04, whereas for the 1956
cohort returns are estimated between 0.05 and 0.07. In all cases, returns
are higher for the older cohort, although they remain substantial for the
12Tibi (1974) notes that after a growth of 9% per annum in new students admitted
to the first year of primary school, numbers actually declined in 1970 and 1971, to then
pick up again.
13This argument applies only to the 1971 policy change because it is the only one that
entailed a reduction that could be implemented rapidly.
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younger one.
As regards the role of survey weights, table A4 in the on-line appendix
shows that results without these weights are almost identical than the
benchmark results.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This paper has sought to estimate the evolution of returns to education
in the MENA over several decades. Comparable education policy changes
spanning more than 20 years in Tunisia enable me to provide such causal
estimates. My results show that rewards of education in terms of high
quality jobs have declined between cohorts born in the 1950s and those
born in the 1970s, although even for the latter they remain substantial.
Although returns to education are estimated at different ages for dif-
ferent cohorts, the life-cycle profile of public sector employment implies
that returns estimated for the different ages at which my estimates refer
to are relatively comparable. If at all, returns to education for youth may
be slightly underestimated, implying that returns to education may have
dropped slightly less. Another important caveat is that, while the pol-
icy adjustments used as instrument are comparable, the compliers of each
(i.e. the individuals induced to obtain more or less education because of
the policy adjustment) may be different. Since my IV estimates are Local
Average Treatment Effects (LATE) for compliers, differences in the IV es-
timates across cohorts may partly reflect heterogenous treatment effects for
the different complier populations. It can be argued, however, that the ef-
fects for such complier populations are interesting in their own right. Being
the individuals at the margin of accessing secondary education, they are
possibly the most relevant ones when considering policy actions to regulate
educational attainment.
My results are consistent with existing non-causal evidence linking ed-
ucation and labor market outcomes in the MENA, such as Binzel and Car-
valho (2016), and confirm that such effects are indeed due to education per
se, and not to other unobserved factors correlated with education. Indeed,
for public sector employment, IV estimates tend to be larger, not smaller,
than OLS ones, possibly because the non-linearity of returns to educa-
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tion over grades (see Pekkarinen and Pellicer (2013) and Riddell and Song
(2011)). Most importantly, the fall in education returns is larger for the IV
estimates than for the OLS ones, although the drop is similar in relative
terms (around 1/3). Thus, it appears that the reduction in returns from
OLS-type of estimates is not due to decreasing selection bias associated to
the rapid increase in educational attainment. One possible explanation for
the lack of importance of selection bias could be the relevance of formal
degrees for hiring, particularly in public sector, which renders irrelevant
other attributes for obtaining good quality employment, as emphasized in
Assaad (2014).
My results contribute to the small but growing literature on causal esti-
mates of returns to education in the MENA region. Pekkarinen and Pellicer
(2013), Aydemir and Kirdar (2017) and Assaad, Aydemir, Dayioglu Tay-
fur, and Kirdar (2016) focus on the education- labor market nexus in the
MENA, whereas Lavy and Zablotsky (2015) and Gulesci and Meyersson
(2014) focus specifically on female outcomes such as fertility and female
religiosity, respectively. Pekkarinen and Pellicer (2013) find strong returns
to education in terms of public employment for older cohorts in Tunisia,
whereas Aydemir and Kirdar (2017) and Assaad et al. (2016) find low wage
returns to education for youth in Turkey and Egypt, respectively. Assaad
et al. (2016) moreover find no returns in terms of public sector employ-
ment. My estimates confirm the decline returns to education for public
sector employment, but provide evidence that returns remain large even
for youth. This disagreement between my estimates and those in Aydemir
and Kirdar (2017) and Assaad et al. (2016) may come from the fact that
they use as instrument changes in years of compulsory education. Such in-
strument estimates the returns to a year more or less of schooling, without
incorporating the consequences of obtaining degrees, or the peer and net-
work effects that follow from progressing to a new level of education. The
instruments I use, in contrast, do incorporate these additional effects of ed-
ucation. The disagreement between my estimates and theirs thus suggests
that education may affect labor market outcomes via peer effects, networks,
or degrees, more than through pure human capital accumulation.
My estimates have implications for understanding the role of returns to
education for political mobilization in MENA. In particular, the decline in
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returns in terms of public sector employment that I estimate is consistent
with the commonly held narrative of increasing grievances and frustration
of MENA youth. However, the fact that returns to education for youth
remain large presents a puzzle to such accounts. The fall of returns I es-
timate, from 0.071 to 0.045, does not appear dramatic enough to warrant
such a strong buildup of grievances. This would be consistent with the re-
cent analysis of education, grievances and political mobilization in Pellicer,
Assaad, Krafft, and Salemi (2017), which suggests that education may have
been relevant for the Arab Uprisings, not via grievances, but instead via
decreasing the costs of mobilization.
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Figure 1: Promotion rates into secondary school
Note: Share of students in the last year of primary school promoted to secondary
school. Sources: (Tarifa 1971) and annual statistical reports on primary education
by the Tunisian Ministry of Education.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the first stage: Attainment of secondary or uni-
versity, by cohort
Note: Share of cohort attaining secondary or university education (i.e. with more than
grade 6 of primary school). The line denotes the fitted values from a regression of such
outcome on a 2nd order polynomial of birth year as well as the three instruments (1971
and 1980 jumps, and 1992 kink). The dashed line is a fitted regression that replaces
the 1971 and the 1980 instruments by indicator functions of cohorts above the modal
cohort among those exposed to the respective policy shift.
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Jump 1971 Jump 1980 Kink 1992 All N
Demographics
Year of birth 1957 1966 1976 1968 1165670
Age 47.89 38.33 28.56 36.91 1165670
Female 0 0 0 0 1165670
Education
No education 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.11 1163065
Primary 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.4 1163065
Secondary 0.29 0.35 0.42 0.37 1163065
University 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.13 1163065
Sec or Uni 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.49 1163065
Approx Grades Completed 6.56 7.5 8.63 7.73 1163065
Employment
Public employee 0.26 0.22 0.13 0.19 1020817
Skilled worker 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09 763108
Other info
N 434322 600212 599262 1165670
Range birth years 1949-64 1958-75 1969-83 1949-83
Range ages 39-60 28-51 20-40 20-60
Mean of variables used in the analysis for the different subsamples used as well as full
sample. All variables except Age and Year of Birth are coded as zero-one variables.
Employment-related variables display a value zero (instead of missing) if the person is
not employed. Skilled worker correspond to the categories of Professionals and
Techinicians from the ILO ISCO-08 classification. The variable public employee are
absent in the 2009 LFS while the variable skilled worker is only present in the 2004
census and the 2009 and 2010 labor force surveys, hence their small sample size.
Table 1: Summary statistics
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1 2 3
Kink 1992
Secondary or University 0.022 0.021 0.025
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
University 0.009 0.01 0.01
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)**
Approx Grades Completed 0.175 0.198 0.192
(0.022)*** (0.032)*** (0.04)***
Jump 1980
Secondary or University 0.09 0.071 0.084
(0.016)*** (0.01)*** (0.016)***
University 0.032 0.027 0.041
(0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)***
Approx Grades Completed 0.797 0.608 0.845
(0.113)*** (0.081)*** (0.127)***
Jump 1971
Secondary or University -0.178 -0.177 -0.179
(0.017)*** (0.012)*** (0.024)***
University -0.024 -0.033 -0.026
(0.012)** (0.007)*** (0.011)**
Approx Grades Completed -1.154 -1.351 -1.229
(0.151)*** (0.126)*** (0.207)***
Polynomial order 1 2 1
Bandwidth 4 7 4
years 2004 10 2004 10 2007 10
N 70 111 40
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
Standarad errors clustered at the birth year level. Coefficients from separate
regressions of the education outcome in each row on year fixed effects, age fixed effects,
a function of birth year and a variable capturing the respective discontinuity, for which
the coefficient is shown. The variable Approx Grades completed is a attributes to each
education level its corresponding mean grades completed estimated from the 2010
LFS. Each row panel corresponds to a different policy reform, the 1992 kink, and the
1980 and 1971 jumps. Each regression uses a window of birth years centered at the
birth year affected by the corresponding jump/ kink. The row bandwith refers to the
number of birth years of the corresponding window. The row polynomial order refers
to the order of the birth year polynomial. The row years indicates the survey years use
in the specification, either all of them (2004-10) or only the latest years (2007-10),
where effects are identified for older individuals.
Table 2: First Stage Results
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1 2 3
Public employee
Kink 1992 0.008 0.005 0.009
(0.001)*** (0.003)* (0.002)***
Jump 1980 0.033 0.027 0.034
(0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)**
Jump 1971 -0.074 -0.081 -0.074
(0.018)*** (0.007)*** (0.022)***
Skilled occupation
Kink 1992 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004)
Jump 1980 0.012 -0.002
(0.012) (0.007)
Jump 1971 -0.049 -0.02
(0.02)** (0.007)***
Polynomial order 1 2 1
Bandwidth 4 7 4
years 2004 10 2004 10 2007 10
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
Standarad errors clustered at the birth year level. Coefficients are from separate
regressions of the outcome in each row panel on year fixed effects, age fixed effects, a
function of birth year and a variable capturing the respective discontinuity, for which
the coefficient is shown in each row. Each regression uses a window of birth years
centered at the birth year affected by the corresponding jump/ kink. The row
bandwith refers to the number of birth years of the corresponding window. The row
polynomial order refers to the order of the birth year polynomial. The row years
indicates the survey years use in the specification, either all of them (2004-10) or only
the latest years (2007-10), where effects are identified for older individuals.
Table 3: Education and desirable jobs, different cohorts. Reduced form
results
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1 2 3 4
Public employee
Kink 1992 0.022 0.044 0.025 0.042
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.01)** (0.013)**
Jump 1980 0.037 0.027 0.039 0.038
(0.001)*** (0.01)** (0.007)*** (0.012)***
Jump 1971 0.037 0.071 0.06 0.063
(0)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.014)***
diff 92 71 -0.015 -0.027 -0.035 -0.021
p value diff 0 0.012 0.003 0.266
Skilled occupation
Kink 1992 0.026 0.009 -0.007
(0.002)*** (0.004)* (0.033)
Jump 1980 0.034 0.019 0.003
(0.002)*** (0.017) (0.007)
Jump 1971 0.034 0.035 0.016
(0.001)*** (0.01)*** (0.004)***
diff 92 71 -0.008 -0.026 -0.022
p value diff 0.001 0.031 0.469
Estimator OLS IV IV IV
Polynomial order 1 1 2 1
Bandwidth 1 4 7 4
years 2004 10 2004 10 2004 10 2007 10
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
Standarad errors clustered at the birth year level. Coefficients are from separate
regressions of the outcome in each row panel on year fixed effects, age fixed effects, a
function of birth year and approximate grades completed, using as instrument a
variable capturing the policy reform in each row in the columns using an IV estimator.
Each regression uses a window of birth years centered at the birth year affected by the
corresponding jump/ kink. The last two rows of each panel correspond to the
difference between the 1992 Kink coefficient and the 1971 Jump coefficient, and the
p-value of this difference, respectively. The row bandwith refers to the number of birth
years of the corresponding window. The row polynomial order refers to the order of
the birth year polynomial. The row years indicates the survey years use in the
specification, either all of them (2004-10) or only the latest years (2007-10), where
effects are identified for older individuals.
Table 4: Education and desirable jobs, different cohorts. IV results
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On-line Appendix
Public sector employment: shares and OLS estimates
of returns to education by age
Figure A1: Public sector employment: shares and OLS estimates of returns
to education by age
Note: Life-cycle pattern of public sector employment (left panel) and of returns to
education in terms of public sector employment (right panel). The left panel traces the
share of public sector employment of cohorts born 2 years apart as they age. the right
panel plots the coefficients of an OLS regression of public sector employment on survey
year dummies, and age dummies interacted with years of education; the coefficients
plotted are the uninteracted years of education coefficient plus those of the age-education
interactions.
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Illustration of reduced form for public sector employ-
ment
Figure A2: Illustration of reduced form for public sector employment, using
all policy changes
Graphical depiction of the reduced form of public sector employment. Dots show resid-
uals from regressions of public sector employment on year and age fixed effects, as a
function of year of birth. The line denotes the fitted values from a regression of such
residuals on a 2nd order polynomial of birth year as well as the three instruments (1971
and 1980 jumps, and 1992 kink). The dashed line is a fitted regression that replaces
the 1971 and the 1980 instruments by indicator functions of cohorts above the modal
cohort among those exposed to the respective policy shift.
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Potential confounders: Share of individuals with no
formal education
1 2 3
Kink 1992
No Education 0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)
Jump 1980
No Education -0.02 -0.009 -0.026
(0.004)*** (0.005)* (0.009)**
Jump 1971
No Education 0.003 0.033 0.013
(0.016) (0.009)*** (0.025)
Polynomial order 1 2 1
Bandwidth 4 7 4
years 2004 10 2004 10 2007 10
N 70 111 40
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
Standarad errors clustered at the birth year level. Coefficients from separate
regressions of no education on year fixed effects, age fixed effects, a function of birth
year and a variable capturing the respective discontinuity, for which the coefficient is
shown. Each row panel corresponds to a different policy reform, the 1992 kink, and the
1980 and 1971 jumps. Each regression uses a window of birth years centered at the
birth year affected by the corresponding jump/ kink. The row bandwith refers to the
number of birth years of the corresponding window. The row polynomial order refers
to the order of the birth year polynomial. The row years indicates the survey years use
in the specification, either all of them (2004-10) or only the latest years (2007-10),
where effects are identified for older individuals.
Table A1: Placebo with no education as outcome variable
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IV results, controlling for no education
1 2 3 4
Public employee
Kink 1992 0.025 0.04 0.03 0.043
(0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.012)** (0.013)**
Jump 1980 0.044 0.057 0.052 0.051
(0.001)*** (0.012)*** (0.006)*** (0.019)**
Jump 1971 0.043 0.072 0.063 0.065
(0)*** (0.01)*** (0.006)*** (0.013)***
diff 92 71 -0.018 -0.032 -0.033 -0.021
p value diff 0 0.005 0.011 0.242
Skilled occupation
Kink 1992 0.031 0.011 -0.015
(0.003)*** (0.009) (0.047)
Jump 1980 0.045 0.015 -0.008
(0.002)*** (0.012) (0.013)
Jump 1971 0.044 0.04 0.011
(0.001)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*
diff 92 71 -0.014 -0.029 -0.026
p value diff 0 0.028 0.554
Estimator OLS IV IV IV
Polynomial order 1 1 2 1
Bandwidth 1 4 7 4
years 2004 10 2004 10 2004 10 2007 10
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
Standarad errors clustered at the birth year level. Coefficients are from separate
regressions of the outcome in each row panel on year fixed effects, age fixed effects, a
function of birth year, the share of individuals with no education, and approximate
grades completed, using as instrument a variable capturing the policy reform in each
row in the columns using an IV estimator. Each regression uses a window of birth
years centered at the birth year affected by the corresponding jump/ kink. The last
two rows of each panel correspond to the difference between the 1992 Kink coefficient
and the 1971 Jump coefficient, and the p-value of this difference, respectively. The row
bandwith refers to the number of birth years of the corresponding window. The row
polynomial order refers to the order of the birth year polynomial. The row years
indicates the survey years use in the specification, either all of them (2004-10) or only
the latest years (2007-10), where effects are identified for older individuals.
Table A2: IV results, controlling for no education
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Robustness to absence of survey weights
1 2 3 4
Public employee
Kink 1992 0.022 0.04 0.022 0.039
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.01)***
Jump 1980 0.037 0.024 0.041 0.035
(0.001)*** (0.01)** (0.006)*** (0.008)***
Jump 1971 0.037 0.072 0.059 0.057
(0)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)***
diff 92 71 -0.015 -0.031 -0.037 -0.019
p value diff 0 0.001 0 0.205
Skilled occupation
Kink 1992 0.026 -0.005 -0.021
(0.002)*** (0.01) (0.026)
Jump 1980 0.034 0.018 0.006
(0.002)*** (0.015) (0.006)
Jump 1971 0.034 0.034 0.017
(0.001)*** (0.009)*** (0.003)***
diff 92 71 -0.008 -0.04 -0.038
p value diff 0.001 0.005 0.13
Estimator OLS IV IV IV
Polynomial order 1 1 2 1
Bandwidth 1 4 7 4
years 2004 10 2004 10 2004 10 2007 10
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
Standarad errors clustered at the birth year level. Coefficients are from separate
regressions of the outcome in each row panel on year fixed effects, age fixed effects, a
function of birth year and approximate grades completed, using as instrument a
variable capturing the policy reform in each row in the columns using an IV estimator.
Observations are aggregated without the use of survey weights. Each regression uses a
window of birth years centered at the birth year affected by the corresponding jump/
kink. The last two rows of each panel correspond to the difference between the 1992
Kink coefficient and the 1971 Jump coefficient, and the p-value of this difference,
respectively. The row bandwith refers to the number of birth years of the
corresponding window. The row polynomial order refers to the order of the birth year
polynomial. The row years indicates the survey years use in the specification, either all
of them (2004-10) or only the latest years (2007-10), where effects are identified for
older individuals.
Table A4: IV results with no survey weights
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